Research
Work in progress
Draft available upon request
The Structure of Bayesian Stable Matchings with Transfers
Classical matching theory gives stable outcomes a distinct structure: an identical set of unmatched agents across stable outcomes (the Lone Wolf theorem) and a lattice of stable payoffs. Hu (2026) shows that under incomplete information matching without transfers, the Lone Wolf property survives whenever stable outcomes share a common information structure. I show that this is not generally true under incomplete information matching with transfers, and give a necessary and sufficient condition under which the Lone Wolf theorem holds generically.
In progress
Deliberation by Ballot: Communication and Consensus in Elections by Repeated Voting
Some of the oldest consensus institutions — conclaves, juries, conventions — do not separate deliberation from voting: members communicate by voting, casting repeated ballots until a supermajority forms. I model committees in which each ballot is semi-binding communication about private information and private biases.
In progress
Implementing Stable Matching under Private Information
This paper implements Bayesian stable matching (Liu, 2020) as a Markov perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a decentralized bargaining process following Elliott and Nava (2019).
In progress
Search and Matching with Bilateral Information Acquisition
We study a search-and-matching market in which agents can costly acquire information about a potential partner before deciding whether to match. Higher-type agents are both more selective and acquire more precise information, generating assortative information acquisition. We establish equilibrium existence and show that, despite the endogenous acceptance curse, equilibrium matching exhibits stochastic positive assortative sorting.